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[So F. No. 19704. In Bank. Oct. 1, 1958.] 
MARTHA MITCHELL et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Witneases - Privileged OommunicatioDS - Public O1Iicers.-A 
defendant is entitled at his .trial to_~l!.certain on !lro~a­
tion the name of an informer JV:bo ~ a material witneSs on 
the issue of guilt. 
[8] Iel. - Privileged OommuDicatioDS - Public O1Iicers.-The rea-
, 80~S that require disclosure of au informer at· the--tnal--mso -
reqUire disclosDre . .at.1h.e preliminary hear~~ce defendant 
~as the right. at. suc~~aring to cross-examine the prosecu-
_tion's witnesses (Pen. Code, § ~1!1)1_and produce witnesses in 
. his own behalf (Pen. Code, I§ 864,866). 
IS] b.olu"bitiQIt: Appli@tioJl. of _ ltules-Oriminal Proceedings-
PreljmjnaTJ' Hearing. Prohibition does not lie to review iUl-
ings ~f the magistrate on the admissib~ity of evidence a~ the 
[1] See Oa1.J'ur •• Witnesses, 131; Am.Jur .. Witnesses, 11535, 
536. 
MeX. Dil. References: [1, 2,4] Witnesses, § 60; [3,5] Prohibi-
tion,l43. 
828 llITcm:I..L tI. SUPERIOR CouRT 
preliminary hearing unless the commitment is u ................ , 
on incompetent evidence. 
[4] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunications-Public otIlcelr8.--TlIul 
value to defendants of disclosure of the names of inf'OrllllU.···'!.l 
at the preliminary hearing is that it might enable them' 
obtain information useful in their defense . at .. the trial ; i~ 
not be presumed that the superior court willerroneoua4' 
disclosure at the trial or fail to grant a continuance if 
necessary to enable 'defendants to locate and int.erview 
informers in the preparation of their defense. 
[6] Prohibition - Application of Bules - Oriminal PrclceediD,p 
Preliminary Hearlni.-.Although the delay inc:ideJlt 
tinuance to enable defendants to locate and inte'I"View 
formers in the preparation of the defense might 
obviated had the magistrate ruled correctly on the adJilliBlsi~ 
bility of evidence, his erroneous ruling did not 
jurisdictional issue such as would authorize a writ of 
tion to prevent trial; wh~re _~here was competent eviideJllceJ 
justify committing defendants-and-m.sruo8nre'of 
the informers could be obtained at the trial, u~~:l;:~~ 
not prejudiced by the error' or -deprived of any 
right. (Pen. Code, § 1404.) 
PROQ~J!1pING in prohibition ,to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from further 
proceedings on certain informations. Writ denied. 
Arthur D. Klang for Petitioners. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. 
Assistant Attorney General, William M. Bennett and Arlo 
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Informations charged defendants with p0s-
session of heroin, two sales of heroin and maintenance of a 
place for the sale of narcotics in violation of Health and Safety 
Code, sections 11500 and 11557. Their motions to set aside the 
informations on the ground that they had not been legally 
committed by a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 995) were denied 
and they now seek a writ of prohibition t~_p-re,!~nt..their trial. 
Evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that police 
officers received information from two informers that de-
fendants were selling narcotics in their apartment. The of-
ficers searched the two informers and removed all articles 
from their clothing. Each of the informers was given $20 
in bills dusted with lluorescent powder. The serial numbers 
) 
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of the bills were recorded. The officers escorted the informers 
to defendants' apartment. The informers entered the apart-
ment separately and in a few minutes. r.etl!!"n!!d sep~rate]y. 
They were then searched. The bills were gone and each in-
former had a bindle of heroin. The Qffi:Gir~ waited--in frout 
of the apartment door for about 10 or 15 minutes. Defendant 
MitchelLopened the door and was immediately placed under 
arrest. She dropped a package of heroin to the fioor. The 
officers arrested defendant Flynn in the bedroom and found 
four bindles of heroin on his person. The officers found the 
bills given to one informer behind one of the dresser drawers, 
but they did not find the bills given to the other informer. 
There was fluorescent powder on both of Mitchell's hands and 
on Flynn's finger tips and shirt. On cross-examination the 
magistrate sustained objections to defendants' questions seek-
ing to ascertain the names of the informers. 
We have concluded that it was error to deny defendants 
disclosure of the names of the two informers at the prelimi-
nary hearing on their cross-examination of the officer who 
testified to the participation of the informers but that pro-
hibition does not lie to restrain the trial of defendants. 
[1] A defendant is entitled at his trial to ascertain on 
cross-examination the name of an informer who is a material 
witness on the issue of guilt. (People v. McShann, ante, p. 
802 [330 P.2d 33]; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 
435, 450-451 [308 P.2d 821].) [2] The reasons that require 
disclosure at the trial also require disclosure at the prelimi-
nary hearing, for the defendant has the right at such hearing 
to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses (Pen. Code, 
§ 865) and to produce witnesses in his own behalf (Pen. Code, 
§§ 864,866). The exercise of these rights at the preliminary 
hearing may enable the defendant to show that there is no 
reasonable cause to commit him for trial and thus to avoid the 
degradation and expense of a criminal trial. 
[3] Prohibition does not lie to review rulings of the magis-
trate on the admissibility of evidence at the preliminary hear-
ing unless the commitment is based entirely on incompetent 
evidence. (Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 7-8 [291 
P.2d 929].) Defendants do not contend that as a result of 
the magistrate's error there is no competent evidence to sup-
port a finding of reasonable cause to commit them for trial. 
(Ct. P"iestly v. Superior Court, ante, p. 812 [330 P.2d 
39].) It is contended, however, that denial of the right of 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing is not only a 
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ruling on the admissibility of evidence but the denial of a eO~J} 
stitutional right. It is unnecessary to resolve this contention,; 
for there was not such an interference with the right of cross-. : 
examination in this case as to justify a writ of prohibition. i 
It does not appear that disclosure of the names of the in-
formers was demanded to enable defendants to discredit the 
prOsecution's evidence at the preliminary hearing or that they 
wished to use the informers as witnesses at that hearing. In-
deed, defendants' brief indicates otherwise: "The defendants 
did not present a defense other than cross-examination in the 
preliminary hearing. They were not required so to do and 
this Honorable Court is aware that not only is it rarely done, 
but would be a foolbardy thing to do." [4] The value to 
defendants of disclosure is that it might enable them to ob-
tain information useful in their defense at the trial. It can- . 
not be presumed that the superior court will erroneously· 
deny disclosure at the trial or fail to grant a continuance if 
it is necessary to enable defendants to locate and interview • 
the informers in the preparation of their defense. [6] Al-
though the delay incidept to such a continuance would have 
been obviated had the magistrate ruled correctly, his erro-
neous ruling on the admissibility of evidence does not raise 
a jurisdictional issue. (Rogers V. 8uperior C01tri. fttpra. 46 
CaI.2d at 6-7.) Since there was competent evidence to justify 
committing defendants and disclosure of the names of the in-
formers can be obtained at the trial, defendants were not prej-
udiced by the error or deprived of any substantial right. 
(See Pen. Code, § 1404.) 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J .• concurred. 
CARTER. J.-I concur in the views expressed in the 
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor. In Priestly v. 
8uperior Court. ante, .p. 812 [330 P.2d 39] I have ex-
pressed my views somewhat at length on the right of a de-
fendant in a criminal case to cross-examine a witness on a 
material issue. 
Defendant contends that the denial of the right of cross- I 
examination in this case was a denial of a constitutional right. 
In the Priestly case I concluded that in the preliminary 
hearing the accused was denied a constitutional right of a 
fair hearing where the magistrate denied him the right of 
:-::iJ. 
) 
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cross-examination on a disputed factual issue and on which 
the outcome of the proceedings hinged. The factual issue dis-
puted in the Priestly case was the presence of probable cause 
for the arrest and search. In this case defendant does not dis-
pute that there was probable cause for the arrest and seizure, 
but only desires to know the informants' identities to better 
prepare his defense at the trial. This is precisely what de-
fendant will receive. However, it is readily apparent that 
the teStimony of the police officers relating the information 
given by the informants is not crucial to the issue of whether 
there is any competent evidence to hold defendant. It cannot 
be said, therefore, that the denial of defendant's right of 
cross-examination amounted t9 a denial of a fair hearing 01' 
to deprivation of his liberty without due process of law. 
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the order discharging the al-
ternative writ of prohibition and denying a peremptory writ, 
for the following reasons: 
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition restraining 
the superior cout:t; from trying petitioners on a charge of 
violating section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (pos-
session of heroin) and section 11557 of the Health and 
Safety Code (maintaining a ·place for the sale of narcotics). 
At the preliminary examination police officE'rs testified 
to being informed by two reliable informantS that pE'titioners 
were selling narcotics in their apartment. After stripping 
and searching the informants and removing all articles of 
their clothing, the oftlcers gave each of .them $20 in bills, 
the serial numbers' of which were recorded, and escorted 
the informants to petitioners' apartment. 
. The bills were dusted with fluorescent powder invisible to 
the naked eye. Separately, the informants entered the apart-
ment and in a few minutes returned. They were then 
searched. The bills were gone, and each had a bindle of 
heroin. . 
The officers then:· waited in front of the apartment door 
for approximately 10 or 15 minutes. It was opened by 
petitioner Mitchell, who was immediately placed under arrest. 
She dropped a package from her hand to the floor, which 
paekage contained heroin. In the bedroom they arrested 
pl'titioner Flynn. Four bindles were found on his person. 
BE'hind one of the dresser drawers the officers found the bills 
given to the first informant. They did not find those given 
the second informant. With a black box they observed fluor-
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escent powder on both hands of petitioner Mitchell and·on 
the fingertips and shirt of petitioner Flynn. On eross:.'; 
examination the officers refused to divulge the names of the 
informant-participants. 
Petitioners' 11010 oontention is that the,y were illegally· 
committed because the magistrate, during the preliminary 
examination, refused to allow them to ask the prosecuting 
witnesses the names of the two informant-participants. 
Thus the question is presented: Will a writ of proh'ibition 
lie to remew the ruling of a committing magistrate upon 1M .~ 
admission or exclusion of etlidence at a preliminaf1/a;-i 
amination' 
No. The rule is settled that the sole province of the writ . 
of prohibition is to arrest proceedings of a tribunal or pe~ 
exercising judicial functions when acting without or in 
excess of jurisdiction. (40 Cal.Jur.2d (1958), Prohibition, 
§ 64, p. 226; Code Civ. Proc., § 1102·; County of 8utter v. 
Superior Court, 188 Cal. 292, 295 [4) [204 P. 849) ; Rebstook 
v. 8uperior Court, 146 Cal. 308, 310 [80 P. 65).) . 
If the court has jurisdiction over both the crime and the 
person of the defendant, prohibition is not available to re-
strain or correct mere errors in procedure, such as rulings 
upon the admissibility of evidence, since such errors can be 
corrected on appeal. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 
17 Ca1.2d 280, 287 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715) ; McGinis 
v. Justice', Court, 28 Cal.App. 680, 682 [153 P. 728] ; 8tate 
ex reI. PardeevtUe Electric Light Co. v. Sachtjen, 245 Wis. 26 
[13 N.W.2d 538] ; 73 C.J.B. (1951), Prohibition, § 12, p. 70.) 
In AbeUeira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, a case 
involving the question as to the propriety of this court's 
issuing a writ of prohibition, it was said at page 286: 
"1. 4 Lack of jurisdiction' as a basis for writ of prohibition . 
• , The first inquiry in this case must, of course, be as to 
the nature and meaning of C jurisdiction'; and here three 
possible sources of confusion must be eliminated . 
• , Becond is the nature of a writ of prohibition, which never 
issues to restrain a lower tribunal for committing mere error 
in deciding a question properly before it. If the lower court 
·Section 1102 of the Code of Civil Proced u re reads: "The writ of 
prohibition arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, 
or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are with-
out or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board 
or pe1'llOll." 
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has power to make a correct determination of a particular 
issue, it clearly has power to make an incorrect decision, 
subject only to appellate review and not to restraint by 
prohibition. Hence, in examining the authorities, we must 
conclude that in those situations ill which a writ of prohibition 
was issued, the particular action restrained was one beyond 
the jurisdiction of the court to take.' t 
The foregoing statement as applicable to the instant ease 
may be paraphrased as follows: 
"A writ of prohibition never issues to restrain a lower 
tribunal from committing mere error in deciding a question 
properly before it. The committing magistrate in the present 
case had power to make a correct determination of the par-
ticular issue presented to it. It clearly had power to make 
an incorrect decision, subject only to appellate review and 
not to restraint by prohibition. Hence, we must conclude 
that in this case a writ of prohibition will not issue because 
the particular action attempted to be restrained was one 
within the jurisdiction of the committing magistrate." 
To the same effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in 8tate ex reI. Pardeeville Electric Light Co. v. 
8achtje'TI, supra, where at page 540 the court said: "Petitioner 
further contends that certain evidence which it offered on the 
trial before Judge Hoppmann was improperly excluded, and 
that if the same testimony were offered again, before the pres-
ent presiding judge, the court might admit same. It is not Ihe 
function of a writ of prohibition to determine the admissibility 
of evidence on the trial of an action in the circuit court. At 
present we are only concerned with the question of the power 
and jurisdiction of the sitting judge. The merits of the 
litigation are not before us." (Italics added.) 
The authority to hear and determine involves the power 
to decide incorrectly as well as correctly in a given ease 
or controversy within the jurisdiction of the committing 
magistrate and does not depend upon the regularity of the 
exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the de. 
cision there made. A writ of prohibition is not employed 
as a means of correcting errors of an inferior tribunal on 
matters of procedure where, as in the instant case, such 
alleged errors may be reviewed on appeal from an adverse 
judgment. 
If the rule were otherwise, in every ordinary action a de-
fendant whenever he chose could halt the proceeding in the 




834 MITCHELL 11. SUPERIOR COURT {50 C.tlH~ 
- ~ 
CJrdinary progress of the action toward a judgment until a" 
reviewing tribunal passed upon an intermediate question 
that hlln RriRen. If such were the rule, reviewing courts 
would in innumerable cases be converted from appellate. 
courts to nisi prius tribunals. 
It is clear that the committing magistrate had jurisdiction ! 
over both the crime charged and the persons of petitioners in 
the present case. It is likewise evident that there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the committing magistrate's find-
ing that there was probable cause to believe that petitioners 
were guilty of the offenses with which they were charged. 
Supporting this view is the statement in petitioners' brief: 
"The defendants did not present a defense other than cross-
examination in the preliminary hearing. They were not 
required so to do and this Honorable Court is aware that 
not only is it rarely done, but would be a foolhardy thing 
to do." 
Since petitioners' sole contention is directed to an error 
in procedure, to wit, improper exclusion of evidence, which I 
error under the rule set forth above will not be considered 
on a petition for a writ of prohibition, the altemative writ 
is properly discharged and the peremptory writ is correctly 
denied. 
SHENK, J., and SPENCE, J.-We concur in the judgment. 
